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ABSTRACT 
The Use of Social Science by the United States 
Supreme Court in Cases Raising Husband-Wife 
and Parent-Child Legal Issues 
by 
James R. Tanner, Master of Science 
Utah State University, 1984 
Major Professors : Drs. Jay Skidmore and Brent Miller 
Department : Family and Human Development 
Th is research provides a descriptive study of the use of social 
vii 
science research conta ined in reported decisions of the United States 
Supreme Court. The cases were selected from case abstracts contained 
in two U.S . Supreme Court digests . The author relied on the court 
reporter's arrangement of abstracts of case decisions (sorted by 
substantive areas of the law) to identify relevant cases presenting 
issues of parent - child and husband-wife relations. 
The following substantive areas were initia ll y se lected using this 
method: abortion, adultery and fornication, adoption, immig rat ion, 
exclusion and deportation, bigamy, bastards, dower, death, domicil, 
divorce and separation, guardian and ward, homestead, husband and wife, 
incompetent persons, infants, kidnapping, indecency, lewdness and 
obscenity, marriage, privacy, poor and poor laws, torts, schools, 
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social secur i ty and unem ployment compensation, wi lls, workmen's compen-
sation, and zoning. Substantive areas receiving one or none citations 
of social sc i ence (in the summary tabulations) were excluded, leaving 
the parent-child areas of abortion, bastards, infants, obscenity, poor 
and poor laws, schools and social security. The above exclusion 
process left the husband-wife areas of adultery and fornication, 
bigamy, divorce and separation, husband and wife, and marriage. The 
entire text and footnotes were analyzed in the selected cases . The 
dat e of the decision, use or non-use of social science research, and 
the nature or disc ipline of the research were recorded and tabulated. 
The substantive caselaw of schools and obscen ity were the substantive 
areas containing the most frequent citations of social science. The 
study revealed a general trend consistent with Christensen's (1964) 
model of family research development. Parent-child opinions revealed a 
general utilization rate of four per cent. The study revealed that 
history and economics , as social science disc i plines, have been cited 
more frequently by the Supreme Court during the period analyzed than 
the social science disciplines of socio logy and psychology. 
(84 pages) 
CHAPTER I 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Introduction 
Family researchers are showing increasing attention to public 
policies and social programs as they involve and have consequences for 
families {Nye & McDonald, 1979; Hill & Leik, 1979). Bronfenbrenner 
{1977, 1979), i n dividing the human environment into a hierarchy of 
systems, has written of the macrosystem (overriding cultural beliefs) 
which influences levels containing the neighborhood (exosystem) and the 
immediate household (microsystem). 
Although the Federal Legislative Branch has general responsibility 
for making federal laws and policy, policy is also contained in actions 
of the Executive Branch {Presidential Executive Orders) and the Judici-
ary (judicial decisions interpreting actions of the Legislative and 
Executive Branches). Based on the assumptions of Bronfenbrenner {1977, 
1979) it can be argued that the members of the U.S. Supr eme Court are 
social engineers with considerable impact on the macrosystem or env i -
ronment within which family members i nteract. To what extent are the 
findings of family researchers used by members of the High Court as it 
develops family policy and the social environment within which famil y 
members interact? 
Background of the Problem 
Prior Studies 
The reseacher has located no prior studies on the use of social 
science research by the U.S. Supreme Court, in cases presenting issues 
of parent-child and husband-wife relations. Although there have been 
prior studies on the use of social science evidence and secondary data 
by the U.S. Supreme Court, as well as state appellate courts, these 
studies have not focused on parent-child or husband-wife relations. 
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Major studies on the U.S. Supreme Court (discussed in greater 
detail in Chapter II [Literature Review]), include work by Rosenblum 
{1977), Bernstein {1968), Davis {1973) and Daniels {1978). Major 
studies in the use of social science and secondary sources in state 
appel late and federal judicial decision -making include the work of 
Marvell {1978), Scurlock {1964), Mason {1968), Pal ley {1966) and Masuda 
( 1976). 
General Contribution of Study 
As detailed in Chapter II (Review of Literature), long-term 
descriptive studies tracing general, chronological trends in the 
Supreme Court's utilization of research (conducted by family and human 
development specialists) are lacking. This study provided such an 
overview, as well as a specific analysis of utilization by theoretical 
discipl ine, and by substantive areas of the law (detailed in Chapters 
Ill, IV, and V). 
Background of Social Concerns 
and Implication of Study 
Two key questions are raised by the use of family research by the 
U. S . Supreme Court. First, what is the fit between "justice" (the 
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basic goal of the legal system) and "truth" (the basic goal of research 
method or science)? Second, what is the quality or validity of family 
research relied upon by the parties in litigation before the Supreme 
Court? 
The Fit Between "Justice" and Trut h " 
Steps in Judicial Decision-Making 
Davis (1973) has identified three distinct steps in judicial 
decision-making. The first step requires finding the law that fits the 
factual situation. The second step involves the ratio decidendi (the 
rationale or r easons for the decision) . The final step involves 
app l ying the legal grounds for a decision to the facts of a given case . 
It is the second step, according to Davis, that the l ega l as well 
as the non-legal or sociological data are incorporated into the deci-
sian-making process (Davis, 1973). McCormick (cited in Clea ry, 1972) 
has built on this notion of integrating "social facts" into policy 
decisions. He has maintained that judges, in deciding the constitutional 
validity of a statute, or extending or restricting a common law rule, 
must act upon knowledge already possessed or upon assumptions, or 
"investigation of the pertinent general facts, social, economic, 
political or scientific" (Cleary, 1972, at p. 767). He has written: 
••• An older tradition once prescribed that judges 
should rationalize their result solely in terms of 
analogy to old doctrines leaving the considerations 
of expediency unstated. Contemporary practice 
indicates that judges in their opinions should 
render explicit their policy judgments and the 
factual grounds therefore ••• (Cleary, 1972, 
at p. 767). 
Historical Influence 
The introduction of family research or "social facts" into the 
legal decision-making process generally takes place by one of three 
methods: 1) the testimony of an expert witness in the lower court is 
reviewed by the Supreme Court as the case is decided on appeal, 
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2) the introduction of family research by one or both of the litigating 
parties in their appellate briefs, and 3) the Supreme Court (by its own 
mot ion or by motion of one of the parties) takes judicial notice of 
family research. 
This judicial reliance on outside expertise has been influenced by 
a number of fa ctors. Three key historical forces may have been 1) the 
availability of family research, 2) the relevancy of social or family 
research and 3) general judicial reliance on experts. 
1) General Availability 
of Family Research 
The general development of family research has been outlined by 
Christensen (1964) as consisting of four stages of development. First, 
the "Pre-Research Period" (the period of time prior to 1850) is viewed 
as a period 'llhen no empirical base existed for thoughts of family life 
in literature, religious writings, and philosophical works. In con-
trast, the source for the thinking of the time is viewed as primarily 
superstition and speculation. The "Social Darwinism" period (1850 to 
1899) was characterized as a period with an emphasis on evolutionary 
studies and the social evolution of marriage and family life. During 
the "Emerging Science" period (1900 to 1950), the publishing of classi-
cal studies on the family occurred. The scientific method as applied 
to marriage prediction and interpersonal relationships of family 
members was a primary focus of research. Finally, the early 1950's 
began the current period of "systematic theory building", with an 
emphasis on providi ng a theoretical base for empirical family research 
and the design of empirical studies that contribute to theory develop-
ment (Christensen, 1964). Phelan {1979) has referred to the volume of 
research and theory on marital and family relationships in recent years 
by noting publication rates in the Inventory of Marriage and Family 
Research {01 son & Dahl, 1975). She observed that "From 1900 to 1964, a 
total of 12,610 published articles were listed, for the period of 1965 
to 1972 there were 6,346 listed, for 1973 and 1974 the number of 
listings totaled 3,502, and between 1975 and 1976 ••• more than 3,500 
articles were published." She underscored the obvious from such 
statistics -- "a large amount of scientific literature on family 
relationships has been accumulating at an accelerating pace" (Phelan, 
1979 at p. xii). 
2) Relevancy of Socia l 
and Family Research 
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In addition to the availability of general research in the family, 
another factor affecting the use of research may be the relevancy of 
any such findings. As referred to above, family researchers have 
recently been writing of the need to examine the consequences of public 
policies and social programs on families and family members (Nye & 
McDonald, 1979 ; Hill & Leik, 1979; Bronfenbrenner, 1977, 1979}. 
The 1978 U.S . Supreme Court decision of Ballew v. Georgia (98 
S.Ct. 1029}, although not directly presenting family and child issues, 
presented social science issues of group decision-making (as the Court 
was confronted with the legal issue of the size of juries). It is 
i nstructive to compare the Ballew decision with the classic Brown case 
in 1954 (discussed in greater detail below) . In Brown v. Board of 
Education of Topeka (347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct . 686}, Chief Justice Earl 
Warren included social science studies in footnote el even of the 
majority opinion. The record indicates that at least 25 studies on the 
effects of group size on jury decision-making were relied upon by the 
Ballew Court in justifying its decision. Relevant social science 
research occupied approximately 14 paragraphs of the 32-paragraph 
Ballew opinion. The Court used language indicating that the research 
findings considered in Ballew Case led them to "conclude" in their 
final holding . 
This simple comparison of space occupied in an opinion by social 
science research provides a rough indication that in recent years, 
relevant social science studies are available to be used by the Court . 
3) History of Expertise 
1 n the Jud1 c1a 1 System 
General use of non-legal expertise . The use of expertise by 
appellate courts in the U.S. was preceded by the English Common Law 
heritage of experts in the trial courts. Commercial and medical 
expertise appeared early in the English decisions. 
Commercial. The use of experts in commercial cases was estab-
lished in England by 1649. The landmark case for the use of such 
experts was Pickering v. Barkley (Styles, 132). In this case the 
commercial issue before the court involved the interpretation of 
commercial instruments. 
Medicine. A physician was called by the prosecution, in the 1679 
case of Rex v. Green (7 Howell, State Trials, 185, 186). The physician 
provided testimony to the trier-of-fact on the medical issue of whether 
the deceased could have died from the wounds upon his body (or if, in 
the absence of blood, he was strangled). In 1620, Alsop v. Bontrell 
(Cro. Jac. 541) was decided. The legal issue before the court was the 
legitimacy of a child. Certain physicians testified that it might well 
be that a woman bore a child forty weeks and nine days after her 
husband's death. The physicians maintained that the time for delivery 
of the child "might be delayed by ill usage or lack of strength" 
(Alsop v. Bontrell, Cro . Jac. 541). 
These cases i llustrate the early Common Law practice of allowing 
the testimony of outside experts. The use of family and chi l d 
expertise from outside the judicial system today is, at least in part, 
the product of the rel iance of the Common Law on the testimony and 
written find\ngs of experts, in cases where it is determined that 
trier-of-fact may be aided. 
4) Landmarks in use of Social Science 
Expertise i n the U.S . Supreme Court 
Louis Brandeis presented his first sociological brief to the 
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United States Su preme Court in 1908 in the case of Muller v. Oregon, 
208 U.S. 412 (1908). The case involved the constitutionality of an act 
pass ed by the Oregon Legislature in 1903, prohibiting the em ployment of 
females and children i n factories, laundries and mechanical esta blish-
ments for more than ten hours during one day. Brandeis, appearing as 
counsel in the case, presented a brief containing material which 
attempted to show how the male and female differed in terms of body 
structure and the amount of physical strength. Court records indicate 
that a sociology graduate student assisted Mr. Felix Frankfurter and 
Brandeis i n assembling the brief . It is of i nte rest to this discussion 
to note that two pages of the Brandeis brief contained his legal argu-
ment; approxi mately one hundred pages contained social scie nce findings 
concerning the relationship of long hours of work and poor health 
(Mu ller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 [1908]). The nature of the find ings 
included over ninety reports of committees, bureaus of statistics, 
inspectors of factories in the United States and Europe, showing the 
effects of long hours of work upon women's health. The brief also 
included similar reports showing the benefits of short hours of labor 
(Davis, 1973, p. 36). 
The second landmark in cases presenting socia l science in family 
and child issues was the classic case of Brown v. Board of Education of 
Topeka (347 U.S. 483, p. 494). The case was landmark for a number 
of legal reasons, but of concern to family researchers shou ld be foot-
note 11 (referred to in the discussion above). The footnote contained 
citations to research by K. B. Clark, as well as other research and 
writings on the effects of prejudice and discrimination on personality 
deve 1 opment. 
The use of social science was important to the strategy of the 
NAACP Legal Defense Fund's (LDF) case in the Brown decision. Kenneth 
Clark noted that the studies which were relied upon ( F oat note ll in 
Brown) by the soci a 1 scientists in arriving at the conclusion that 
racial segrega tion was damaging to the human personality were not 
studies which were specifically carried out for the segregation cases. 
Systematic research on the pyschological aspects of racial prejudice, 
discrimination, and segregation had been taking place for more than 
fifteen years (Clark, 1960) . He wrote: 
The White house Conference Manuscript which was cited 
by the United States Supreme Court in footnote eleven 
in the Brown decision was a compilation of all of the 
availabrekilowledge of the effects of prejudice and 
discrimination on personality development in children 
and was prepared ••• months before he was aware of 
the fact that the NAACP intended to bring cases before 
the federal courts challenging the validity of segre-
gated schools ••• The primary research studies were 
conducted ten years before these cases were heard on 
the trial level ••• (Clark, p. 229). 
The nature of Clark's individual research consisted of a "Dolls 
Test" on some of the plaintiff chi l dren to determine whether the 
general findings from the larger number of Negro children who had been 
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tested years before were true also for the children who were the actual 
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plaintiffs in these cases. It was the assumption (of the NAACP at-
torneys) that general scientific findings would have more weight in a 
courtroom if it could be demonstrated that they could also be applied 
in specific cases and for the particular plaintiffs before the court 
(Clark, p. 229). Clark's research was labeled as "misleading" by Haag 
(1957) and Footnote Eleven was referred to as "unfortunate" by Cahn 
( 1g 56). 
The Quality and Validity of Research in Litigation 
Daniels (1978) wrote of the "shifting sands" concern for con-
structing social policy on social science research . Cah n wrote of a 
similar concern of a prominent jurist of mixing policy and science: 
Recognizing as we do now how sagacious Mr. Justice 
Holmes was to insist that the Constitution be not 
tied to any economic system whatsoever, we ought to 
keep it similarly uncommitted in relation to the 
other social sciences. (Cahn, 1955, p. 166). 
Future research may examine this question (as detailed further in 
Chapter V, Discussion, Future Research). A cursory review of the 
status of the cases selected in this study (see Appendix for listing) 
reveal that none of the cases that have cited family research have been 
overturned. As a result, it is difficult to argue that social science 
"caused" the precedent to be overturned. 
The current thesis study limits the scope of inquiry to the extent 
to wh ich family research is used by the U.S. Supreme Court, the chronology 
of such use, and the scientific disciplines used in justifying the 
decisions. 
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Statement of the Problem 
Several problems exist in generalizing the preceding research on 
judicial use of social science to the issue of utilization of family 
and child (social science) research by the U.S. Supreme Court. First, 
the research has often focused on a limited number of cases (Miller & 
Barron, 1975; Davis, 1973; Daniels, 1978) or a limited period of time 
(Daniels, 1978; Bernstein, 1968). Second, in view of the mushrooming 
interest in family research in recent years (Phelan, 1979) earlier 
utilization studies will not reflect uti l ization unde r the body of 
scientific knowledge available at the present time . The studies 
reflecting specific court terms or limited cases provide great detail, 
but fail to offer a descriptive analysis of the development of social 
science use by the Court. Overall descriptive studies are unavailable 
on the judicial use of social science findings by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in cases presenting issues of parent-chi l d or husband-wife 
relations. In addition, overall descriptive studies regarding inter-
disciplinary differences in the use of social science research by the 
Court are unavailable . 
Purpose of the Study 
Two basic questions have emerged from the literature concerning 
utilization of social science by the U.S. Supreme Court. First, what 
is the ove ra 11 usage of soci a 1 science by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
cases presenting issues of parent - child and husband-wife relations? 
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Second, are social science data utilized equally in various substantive 
areas of the law, in cases presenting issues of parent-child and 
husband-wife relationships? 
As mentioned above, the purpose of this study was to determine the 
degree of utilization of social science findings by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in cases presenting issues of parent-child and husband-wife 
relations. The study focused on the frequency of use of social science 
data, the year of any decisions uti lizing the data and the substantive 
area of law i n which the social science data were utilized. Chapter II 
(Review of Literature) provides a detailed review of prior research on 
social science and judicial decision-making. 
13 
CHAPTER I I 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Marvell (1978) has noted that empirical data have been emphasized 
in U.S. Supreme Court briefs and opinions at least since the turn of 
the century. Rosenblum (1977) reviewed Supreme Court opinions every 
five years from 1954 through 1974 and found that the opinions cited 
social science sources in 10 percent of the approximately six hundred 
cases. There is a slight tendency toward more use in later years 
(Marvell, 1978, pp. 365-366). Bernstein (1968) studied the 1965 terms 
of the U.S. Supreme Court and found that 26 social science sources were 
cited in 218 opinions. Scurlock (1964) studied 85 criminal cases 
(decided between 1958-1962) and found that the court used empirical 
data in seven cases, citing at least 30 authorities (Marvell , 1978). 
Studies of Other State and Federal Appellate Courts 
Marvell has reported research in the 1920's of seven state supreme 
court justices. They reported that they did not believe in using or at 
most rarely used, statistical and other sociological data (Queries 
Concerning Methods of Work in Supreme Courts, 8 J. Am . Jud . Soc'y 165, 
169 [1925]; 10 J. Am . Jud. Soc'y 57, 58 [1926]). Scurlock, i n 
studying approximately 100 criminal cases in Missouri, California, and 
New York courts of last resort in the late 1950's and early 1960 ' s 
found that the Missouri court cited no empirical references, and the 
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California and New York courts each cited about ten references in three 
or four cases. 
Marvell (1g78) reviewed six federal circuit and state appellate 
courts in 112 cases during a one year period ending June, 1972. He 
interviewed the present and recently retired justices (46), law clerks 
(33), staff members (17), and attorneys (36) who argued before the 
cou rt s. He studied a "focal court" (the supreme court of a northern 
industrial state which asked to remain unidentified), the First and 
Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeals, the Rhode Island and Ohio Supreme 
Courts, and the Massachusetts Supreme Court. Marvell summarized his 
findings: 
Five majority and eight minority op1n1ons, in 10 
of the 112 focal court cases studied over a year, 
mentioned empirical data, representing 7 percent 
of all opinions, but in most there was just a 
quick reference to one or two sources . As with 
social facts, however, the opinions gave only a 
rough indication of the attention given empirical 
data because its use may not be acknowledged . In 
most of these cases much more empirical data were 
in the briefs or uncovered by the judges than were 
mentioned in the opinions ••• In any event, the 
use of empirical data t o support social facts was 
fairly limited . Only one-sixth of the opinions 
contained social facts as an important link in the 
empirical data, and social facts elsewhere were 
rarely supported by data presented to or found by 
the justices ••• None of those interviewed in 
Ohio had run across empirical data used as social 
facts, and circuit judges in the Rhode Island and 
Massachusetts justices, based on what was said in 
the interview, use it only one or two cases a year 
on the average ••• This slight use ••• under-
states the importance of this mate ri al because it 
is used in the more important cases (Ma rvell, 1g78, 
p. 187). 
Merryman (1977), in studying the citation practice of the Cali -
fornia Supreme Court, found that in 1gso and 1960 the court cited only 
15 
one or two nonlegal sources for empirical data ~ach year, and then in 
1970 about fifteen such citations appeared (the bulk of the fifteen 
were cited by one judge in approximately six cases). Archibald (1957} 
in an empirical study of citation practice of the Ohio Supreme Court 
for the years 1951 through 1955 showed no such citations. Studies of 
the Iowa and Kansas Supreme Courts found that about half the justices 
considered literature in the social sciences important or very im-
portant; the justice's views varying greatly on each court, though 
overall the two courts were about the same (Mason, 1968} . Pal ley 
(1966} found seven of eight justices on a New York intermediate 
appellate court reported that the findings of social science had value 
in their decision-making. Masuda (1976} found that less than half of 
California intermediate court judges considered "non-legal" sources 
important in reaching decisions. 
U.S. Supreme Court 
Daniels (1978) examined the use of social science in constitution-
al policy-making in the 19 72 U.S. Supreme Court Term. Dav is (1973) 
examined the United States Supreme Court and the uses of social science 
by conducting a case analysis of Muller v. Oregon (208 U.S. 412, 1908}, 
Sweatt V. Painter (399 U.S. 629, 1950), Brown v. Board of Education 
{347 U.S. 483, 1954), In Re: Girad Estate, {386 Pa. 548, 1956}, and in 
"non-educational cases" (involving anti-trust, criminal, church-state, 
trademark, natura lizat ion, and censorship). Miller and Barron (1975} 
conducted a case analysis of the United States Supreme Court cases of 
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New York Times v. Sullivan {376 U.S. 254, 1964), Roe v. Wade {410 U.S. 
113, 1973) and Doe v. Bolton {410 U.S. 179, 1973). 
Daniels observed in his literature rev iew that the literature on 
the use of social science in constitutional litigation has centered 
primarily on race relations. He cited Rosen's study {1972) as the 
"only major study" of the use of social science as of 1978 (the date of 
Daniel's study). 
Daniels examined the 1972 term of the U.S. Supreme Court. His 
analysis included a case study of San Antonio Independent School 
District v. Rodriguez in an examination of the use of social science in 
detail (supra, pp. 30-31). He further examined appellate briefs 
presenting data, and appellate briefs not presenting data. Daniels' 
study of selected cases of the court and his analysis of the empirical 
approach in judicial decision-making is enlightening as to the judicial 
decision process. However, it does not provide sufficient knowledge 
for family researchers in assessing the overall picture of social 
science use. Daniels has observed that the question of how much 
influence social science exerts on a judge's decision is important, but 
it may be a question for which precise answers do not exist (supra, 
p. 4). He dist i nguished between the process of decision and the 
process of justification. The process by which a conclusion is reached 
is called the process of "discovery"; the process by which a conclusion 
is justified is called the process of "justif ication" (supra, p. 5) . 
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Other Research 
The present topic is interdisciplinary, including research in the 
many fields of social science and law. Scope is an obvious problem in 
outlining general trends for these varied academic areas in U.S. 
Supreme Court decision-making. A number of writers have addressed the 
topics of the use of social science in judicial decision-making and the 
use of social science by the U.S. Supreme Court. The following studies 
are selected key studies having relevance to the general topic outlined 
above, as ap~ied to judicial decision-making in cases presenting legal 
issues between husbands and wives and parents and children. 
Scurlock {1964) examined 569 appellate decisions to measure the 
reliance of judges on the products of scholarship of others. He 
selected decisions from three diverse state jurisdictions and the U.S. 
Supreme Court in an attempt to assure representativeness. He chose the 
state of Missouri, as representative of the Middle West, California, as 
representative of the West, and New York, as representative of the 
East . Scurlock read 96 Missouri crimina l cases in order. He began 
with decisions of June 11, 1962 and proceeded back to May 8, 1961. He 
treated the Missouri and New York cases in a similar manner. He 
selected one hundred cases in California during the period of September 
27, 1962 to January 20, 1960. In New York he selected one hundred 
cases during the period of July, 1962 and April 16, 1959. 
In addition, Scurlock selected the criminal law and procedure 
topics of blood tests, breath tests, radar, insanity and sexua l 
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psychopathy from 188 cases for the period of April, 1956 to March, 1962 
(Vo l ume One of West's General Digest is cited by Scurlock as the source 
for the selection process) . The Digest reported selected cases from 42 
different states. Added to the concentration of cases from California, 
Missouri, New York and the United States Supreme Court, the total of 
investigated cases numbered 569. He noted that two cases, one from 
Missouri and one from New York, were calculated both in the juris-
dictional and topical tabulation. 
Scurlock found the most frequent reference to scholarly works came 
from Justices Douglas, Frankfurter, Black, and Stewart. Newman (1959} 
studied the period 1924-1956 and found Frankfurter leading the frequen-
cy of citations of law review articles. He was followed by Black and 
Douglas. Newman found the legal writers most cited to be Felix Frank-
furter, Charles Warren, Thomas Reed Powell, Erwin N. Griswald, James M. 
Landis, Zechariah Chafee, Edward S. Corwin, Edmund M. Morgan, Roscoe 
Pound and Edwin Borchard . 
These studies on the use of secondary sources by appellate courts 
and the U.S. Supreme Court reflect prior research on trends of utiliza-
tion of outside information in judicia l decision-making. Radin (cited 
in Scurlock, 1964, p. 259} has observed that English pract ice forbade 
textbook citation. Scurlock has observed (Scurlock, p. 259} that 
American lawyers used and cited treatises, despite the English practice 
prohibition. The American use of treatises, according to Scurlock, was 
due to insufficiency of local case or statutory authority in most 
American jurisdictions in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century. 
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Scurlock called the legal profession's prejudice against academic 
works enduring (Scurlock, p. 260). He wrote in 1964: 
When writings emanating from the law schools, in 
particular law review articles, ceased about thirty-
fo ur years ago to be rejected out to hand by the run 
of judges and lawyers, a very significant stage in 
the development of American law had been reached. 
Moreover, the average annual frequency of citation 
of the academic product has greatly accelerated 
since the time of overcoming of the great prejudice. 
Bernstein (1968) studied the 1965 Term of the U.S. Supreme Court 
and the use of secondary source material. He defined "secondary source 
mater·ial" as "everything which is not primary authority", citing E. 
Pollack (Bernstein, 1968, p. 56). He further defined "secondary source 
material" as decisions, statutes, constitutional provisions, agency 
regulations, or policy statements, congressional debates or hearings, 
briefs of parties, and materials which were involved in the development 
of a doctrine or enactment of a statute (Bernstein, 1968) . 
Bernstein categorized secondary sources into six categories: law 
reviews, law books, history books, newspapers, special reports, and 
other (supra, p. 64) . The category "special reports" included all 
detai 1 ed studies of specific topics whether offici a 1 governmenta 1, 
quasi-governmental , or unofficial studies. The last category "other" 
contained the residuum-- "novels, dictionaries, nonlegal periodicals, 
and the li ke" (supra, p. 64). He found that the special reports 
category accounted for six percent of the total secondary source 
citations. The "other" category was used by the Court in twelve 
percent of the total secondary source citations. 
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In Bernstein's study of the October 1965 Term of the Supreme 
Court, he found that secondary source materials were cited in almost 
half of the opinions written (218 for the Term). He further found that 
constitutional cases accounted for less than 45 percent of the opinions 
containing secondary citations. However, these opinions contained 53 
percent of the total secondary citations. 
As previously stated, there have been no previous studies of 
Supreme Court usage of social science in cases presenting family 
issues. The present study will provide an overview, as well as provide 
a specific analysis of Supreme Court utilization of family research by 
theoretical discipline, and by substantive area of the law. This 
information will expand our understanding of how social science data 
are used by the United States Supreme Court. 
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CHAPTER Ill 
METHODOLOGY 
Review of Selected Cases 
The research method of this study assumed that the citation of 
social science findings in the text and footnotes of official opinions 
issued by the Supreme Court is evidence of reliance on or at l east some 
attention to the study. Of course, this assumption was not made if 
specific language of the opinion writer disclaimed reliance. 
Two independent variables were recorded from the case digests 
1) the date of the decision and 2) the substantive issues of law 
(related to parent-child and husband-wife relations) presented in the 
case. The dependent variable, utilization of social science, was 
recorded as social science citations appeared in the opinions studied. 
The investigator reviewed approximately four hundred and fifty 
abstracts of cases to make the initial se l ection and identification of 
cases presenting parent-child and husband-wife decisions. The cases 
presenting parent-child issues numbered 262 . The total number of cases 
presenting husband-wife relations issues was 181. The period of 
selected caselaw extended from the Court ' s first recorded cases on the 
identified subject matter (1792) to January, 1980 . 
Method of Se lecting Unit of Analysis 
The cent ral research method empl oyed in the study was content 
analysis. He case decision (see sample case decision in Appendix 8) 
was the unit of analysis. Selected case decisions were arrived at 
after several preliminary steps. 
First, case abstracts (see sample case abstract in Appendix C) 
22 
were reviewed in two commercial sources -- West Publishing Company's 
United States Supreme Court Digest (1982) and Lawyer's Cooperative 
Publishing Company's Digest of United States Supreme Court Reports 
(1982). The case abstract (providing a summary of a holding by the 
Court in the case) usually consists of a one paragraph descriptive 
synoposis. The case abstracts were relied upon to identify the relevant 
cases presenting issues of husband-wife and parent-child relations. The 
initial selection of substantive legal areas, using the case abstract 
summaries, produced the following topics: abortion, adoption, adultery 
and fornication, bastards, bigamy, death, deportation, divorce and 
separation, domicile, dower, exclusion, guardian and ward, homestead, 
husband and wife, immigration, incompetent persons, indecency, infants, 
kidnapping, lewdness and obscenity, marriage, poor and poor laws, 
privacy, schools, social security and unemployment compensation, torts, 
wills, workmen's compensation, and zoning . Using this method, the 
investigator reviewed approximately four hundred and fifty abstracts of 
cases. 
Second, the case abstracts allowed the researcher to l ocate the 
text of each case decision because each reported abstract contains the 
official citation volume and page number of a given case decision (see 
sample case decision in Appendix B). The text of t he case decisions 
were located in the appropriate court reporters (depending on the 
citation, United States Supreme Court Digest, 1982, and Digest of United 
States Supreme Court Reports, 1982). The entire text and footnotes of 
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every case in the selected legal areas (outlined tn step one) were read 
for evidence of social science use by the Court. This method provided 
a review of the universe of reported caselaw in the selected substantive 
legal areas. 
Criteria for Selection of Social Science Use 
The researcher used the definition of "social science" employed by 
Davis (1973). Davis defined the term to include the findings of 
sociologists, psychologists, social psychologists, psychiatrists, 
economists, political scientists, anthropologists, and scholars from 
other disciplines who focus their attention on men in interaction. He 
wrote that "social science data refers to the product of systematic 
usually quantitative -- inquiry into human relations presented by 
representatives from any one of the above disciplines" (Davis, 1973, 
p. 20). Davis obviously defined the study of "men" in the generic 
sense to include the study of the behavior and interactions of mankind. 
The investigator made written notations, in step two, on each of 
the se l ected cases as to the presence or absence of social science . 
Those cases that were noted as containing social science were further 
analyzed (see Appendix A) in step three . 
Four principal sources for the introduction of social science 
research were noted in the selected cases. The sources included 1) 
direct reference by the Court to research (cited directly in the text 
or footnotes of the opinion), 2) empirical research cited through l aw 
journal articles, 3) empirical research cited through genera l books, 
and 4) empirical research cited in governmental hearings. 
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The author searched all law rev iew articles wh ich were cited in 
the text and footnotes of the Court's opinion. The search did not 
extend to all of the additional citations contained in the cited law 
review articles on the assumption that the article, to have been relied 
upon, was to have been mentioned by the Court in the opinion. The 
search did not extend to general books and publications (due to a lack 
of uniformity in avai lable sources) nor did it extend to transcripts of 
the proceedings of governmental hearings (due to the scope of such a 
review). Steps one and two of this method were conducted in a univer-
sity law school library. The investigator pulled the relevant law 
books from the shelves to analyze the cases. In view of the time 
intensive method data collection (ultimate ly over one hundred hours) 
involved with this research, pages were xeroxed which were recorded (i n 
step two) as displaying social science in text or footnotes. This 
allowed much content analysis to take place outside the library and 
ult imatel y prov ided the data for the step three analysis. 
Summary tabulations (usage of social science) were prepared for 
each substantive legal area initially selected . Substantive legal 
areas receiving one or none citations of social science (in the summary 
tabulations) were excluded, leaving the parent-child areas of abortion, 
bastards, infants, obscenity, poor and poor laws, schools and social 
security. The above exclusion process left the husband-wife areas of 
adultery and fornication, bigamy, divorce and separation, husband and 
wife, and marriage. 
25 
The researcher recorded the use of social science in the following 
manner in step three. First, the description of the study (in the 
official language of the court), the tit le of the study, and the source 
(research journal, etc.) were used as indicators of the nature of the 
social science data. In cases where language of the court or title was 
too ambiguous to classify precisely, the data were categorized as 
"general source of social science" or "undetermined". The use of 
sta tisti cs was classified in those cases in which statistics were used. 
Appendix A provides a detailed, case by case analysis of the 
selected opinions. The legend provides the categories of discipl ines 
and sources through which the social science was introduced. The 
coding included the recording of page and footnote numbers to identify 
the locat ion within a decision where the social science source was 
used. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
In General 
Figure 1 presents a visual depiction of the various social science 
disciplines used by the U.S. Supreme Court in the selected cases 
presenting issues of husband-wife and parent-child relations. It is 
clear that history and economics have most frequently been used to 
justify policy in these selected family issues . 
The number of cases utilizing social sci ence are displayed graphi-
cally in Figure 2. It is obvious that the substantive caselaw of 
"schools" and "obscenity" have produced the greatest number of social 
science citations and numbers of cases containing citations 
(Figure 2). 
Chronological Trends 
Chronological trends in the use of social science in constructing 
constitutional policy related to the family are shown in Figure 3. The 
stages of development of the field of fdmily study are compared in the 
graphic representation (Family Study Development Stages as Outlined by 
Christensen, 1964, described on pages four and five of this thesis) . 
The recorded social science utilization of the Supreme Court appears to 
be roughly consistent with Christensen's overall model of the development 
of family research, except that social science citations were almost 
totally lack i ng i n the most recent years analyzed {1977-1979). 
Comparison of Usage by Parent-Child and 
Husband-Wife Substantive Legal Areas 
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Tables 1 and 2 provide comparisons of social science utilizat ion 
rates and total number of statistical citations in parent-child and 
husband-wife caselaw. Parent-child cases (total 262) revealed an 
overall utilization rate of 23 percent {60 cases). Husband-wife cases 
(total 181) revealed an overall utilization rate of four percent (eight 
cases). The total number of statistics cited in parent-child cases was 
162 for the period studied. The total number of statistical citations 
in husband-wife relations for the same period was ten. 
Comparison of Usage by Discipline 
and Substantive Area of the Law 
Tables 3 and 4 provide a breakdown of the number of citations by 
discipl ine (social science) and substantive area of the law in the 
general areas of husband-wife and parent-child relations. The parent -
child caselaw contained 350 citations. The husband-wife caselaw 
contained only thirteen citations . 
The data were examined with regard to using statistical tests of 
significance. Chi-square was considered as a tool to determine the 
significance of differences between the usage of social science 
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research in parent-child and husband-wife legal topics, as well as 
differences between disciplines. However, tests of statistical signif-
icance were decided against for two reasons. The first reason not to 
employ statistical tests was based on the fact that there were very 
small cell sizes in husband-wife legal topics by discipline; expected 
cell sizes of less than one made it inadvisable to calculate the 
statistics. The second reason for not using tests of statistical 
significance was because they were not necessary; the major differences 
observed were big differences. The supreme court has cited social 
science much more often {by a factor of about 25) in parent-child legal 
issues than in husband-wife issues and, similar ly, history and eco-
nomics are cited far more often than any other social science disci-
plines. These conclusions can be stated confidently without tests of 
statistica l significance . 
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Table 1 
Supreme Court Social Science Usage by Substantive Law Area: 
Number and Percentage of Cases and Number of Statistical 
Citations in Parent-Child Relations Cases 
Total Number of Number of 
Cases Presenting Number of Cases Statistical 
Substantive Area Parent-Child Utilizing Social Citations 
of the Law Legal Issues Science Opinions 
Abortion 9 * ( 4), 44% (3), 2% 
Bastards 19 (3), 16% (0), 0% 
Infants 51 (2), 4% (23) ,14% 
Obscenity 27 (15), 56% ( 3), 2% 
Poor and Poor Laws 29 (B), 28% (34), 21% 
Schools 53 (24), 45% (9?), 61% 
Socia 1 Security 10 (2), 20% ( 2), 1% 
TOTAL 262 (60), 23% (162), 100% 
NOTE: Substantive areas of death, domicil, and kidnapping were 
originally included, but were exc luded due to one or none 
citations or cases 
* Number of cases indicated in parentheses 
in 
32 
Table 2 
Supreme Court Social Science Usage by Substantive Law Area: 
Number and Percentage of Cases and Citations 
in Husband-Wife Relation Cases 
Total Number of 
Cases Presenting 
Substantive Area Husband-Wife 
of the Law Legal Issues 
Adultery and 
Fornication * (4 ) ' 2.2% 
Bigamy (ll) ' 6.1 % 
Divorce and 
Separation (46)' 25.4% 
Husband and Wife ( 104)' 57.5% 
Marriage ( 16)' 8.8% 
TOTAL (181)' 100% 
Number of Cases 
Utilizing Social 
Science 
(1), 25% 
(2)' 18% 
(0)' 0% 
(3)' 3% 
(2) ' 13% 
(8)' 4% 
* Number of cases indicated in parentheses 
Number of 
Statistical 
Citat ions in 
Opinions 
(O) 0% 
(0) 0% 
** (9)' 90% 
(1)' 10% 
(0) ' 0% 
(10)' 100% 
** Number of statistical citations indicated in parentheses 
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Table 3 
Supreme Court Social Science Usage by Discipline: 
Parent-Child Relations 
Number of Citations 
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(10) (17) (10) (3)• (40) 
Abortion 25 42.5 25 7. 5 11.4 
lQ:1 §l,Q ~ lQ:1 
(4) (1) (5) 
Bastards 80 20 1.4 
u l,l 
(1) (3) (1) (1) (6) (3) (15) 
Infants 6. 7 20 6. 7 6. 7 40 20 4.4 
.LS. hl l,l l,_Q i§_,l lQ:1 
(13) (5) (1) (5) (2) (15) (6) (47) 
Obscenity 27.7 10.6 2.1 10.6 4.3 31.9 12 .8 13.4 
~ hl l,l 100.0 !§..,2 ~ £9..,1 
(5) (4) (1) (2) (2) (14) 
Poor and 35.7 28.6 7.1 1.4 1.4 4 
Poor Laws L§. lU l,_Q ~ .§..,1 
( 15) (60) (40) (75) (3) (16) (5) ( 15) (229) 
Schools 6.6 26.2 17.5 32.8 1.3 7.0 2.2 6.6 65.4 
~ ~ l.QQ.,Q J1..,1 .!l.J. 48.5 1U 52.0 
TOTAL (28) I (66) (40) (97) (27) (5) (12) (33) (13) (29) (3 50) I Discipli ne 
Usage 8 18.9 11.4 27.7 I 7. 7 1.4 3 . 4 9.4 3. 7 8.4 100.0 
NOTE: SUBSTANTIVE AREAS OF DEATH, DOMICIL, KIDNAPPING, AND SOCIAL SECURITY HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED DUE 
TO ONE OR NONE CITATIONS 
'* Number o ~" citations indica ted in parentheses. Percentage indica ted by second figure 
( not inclu-ded inside parentheses) represents substa nt ive legal areas. Underli ned figure 
indicates percentage of social science usage in given discipline by substantive area of 
the law. Percentag~s in final column refer to percent of total citations of the given 
substantive legal a ~"'ea in which social science was used. 
' 
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Table 4 
Supreme Court Soc ia l Science Usage by Discipline: 
Husba nd-Wife Relations 
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Bigamy (1) ( 1) ( 1) (2) 
.21 
Husband and (2) (1) (4) (7) 
Wife . 5 
Marriage (3) ( 1) (4) 
.29 
TOTAL (3) (1) (8 ) ( 1) (14) 
23.0 7.7 61.5 7.7 1.0 (100%) 
NOTE: Substantive Areas of Adultery and Fornication and Divorce and 
Separation have been excluded due to one or none citations 
* Number of citations indicated in parentheses. Percentage 
indicated by second figure (not included inside parentheses). 
CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION 
The purpose of this st udy (as outlined in Chapter I) was to 
detennine the degree of utilization of social science findings by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in cases presenting parent-child and husband-wife 
relations. 
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Content analysis (as detailed in Chapter Ill) revealed different 
utilization rates of social science by the High Court in selected 
substantive areas of the law. The study revealed an average number of 
four cases utilizing social science du r ing the period of 1950-1979 
(Christensen's "Systematic Theory Building" period) compared to an 
ave rage number of two cases utilizing social science du r ing the peri ad 
of 1899-1950 (Christensen's "Emerging Science" period). The chrono-
logical trends outlined by Figure 3 show greater utilization by the 
Supreme Court, paralleling the availability and development of family 
studies research. 
This study has revealed that the disciplines of history and 
economics have been used more frequently by the Supreme Cou rt during 
the period analyzed than the other areas of social sciences. The study 
has contributed to the knowledge of family researchers on the macro-
system (overriding cultural beliefs) and more specifical ly, on the 
sources of decision-making of family matters by the U.S. Su preme Court. 
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Limitations of Study 
Several limitations exist with the research method employed in 
this study. First, some overlap exists i n the way that substantive 
legal areas (abortion, divorce and separation, etc.) are grouped into 
cases presenting issues of "parent-child" or "husband-wife" re 1 at ions. 
Second, the current research method has the limitation of reliance 
on readily available information contained in 1) the text and footnotes 
of the opinion, 2) the title of the study, or 3) the text and footnotes 
of the cited law review articles. The investigator could not review 
all cited books or transcripts of cited government hearings (due to 
time and effort limitations, as well as a problem with out of print 
books, treatises, etc.). 
As described in Chapter Ill (r~ethodology), the author codified the 
sources in the general heading "Social Science: Discipline Not Identi-
fied" in those cases for which precise determination of the discipline 
could not be made. Likewise, the use of statistics by the Court in its 
decision-making process was recorded even though it was not possible to 
define with precision, the discipline, if any, the opinion writer was 
relying on. 
Future Research Studies 
Two future research studies are suggested by the current work. 
First, further research might compare social science studies initially 
cited by attorneys in their briefs (for the period studied i n the 
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current study) with the social science studies accepted or cited by the 
Court (in the text and footnotes of the opinions). This research 
could examine judicial acceptance of social science in the same sub-
stantive l egal areas selected in this study in relation to the use of 
social science in the briefs prepared by attorneys . 
The second major line of research suggested is a closer analysis 
of the validity of using social science citations as an indicator of 
use or "acceptance" of soci a 1 science by the court. Utilization rate 
of the Court, based on chronological development may be somewhat 
misleading. It may well be that the Court resorts to family research 
in justifying landmark cases of precedential value. Subsequent cases 
may be consistent with the Court's holding in the precedent case, but 
not contain the justification process necessary in the earlier prece-
dent case due to the judicia l doctrine of stare decisis (reliance of 
court in later case on prior judicial precedent). 
Further research could examine the criticism expressed by Daniels 
{1978) concerning the "shifting sands" (inconclusive and changing) 
nature of basing constitutional policy on socia l science . Further 
research could compare, for example, the line of caselaw following the 
precedent case (identified in this descriptive study) which relied on 
social science with the line of case law for a comparable sample that 
did not rely on a social science base. The Shepard ' s Citations service 
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(published by Shepard's, McGraw-Hill Publishers, Colorado Springs, 
Colorado, and serving as a routine and comprehensive citation system, 
with cumulative supplements) could serve as an available resource for 
such research. The current availability of computer-assisted research 
such as Lexis (Mead Data Control, Dayton, Dhio) or Westlaw, (West 
Publishing Co ., Minneapolis, Minn.) provides the technology for such 
research in minimum periods of time. 
Recommendati ons 
The United States Supreme Court, according to this study and the 
studies of others (Daniels, 1978; Davis, 1973), is using social science 
research in decisions affecting family relationships and family mem-
bers. As discussed previously, this study located sixty cases (23% out 
of 262 selected cases) presenting parent-child legal issues and utilizing 
social science . Eight cases (4% out of 181 selected cases) presenting 
issues of husband-wife relations utilized socia l science in the reported 
opinion. 
As discussed in the paragraphs above, the overall low utilization 
rate of social science by the Court in the substantive areas of 
ma rriage and parent-child relations may well be influenced by the fact 
that those opinions requiring the justification of a position are the 
decisions that will reflect the use of socia l science. The subseque nt 
cases relying on the initial precedent will rel y on the principle 
established (possibly by the input of social science to the court) but 
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may not reflect additional citations of family and child studies. As a 
result, numbers tell only part of the story. 
Should social science be used more by the Supreme Court in its 
decision-making on parent-child or husband-wife relations? The 
research shows that the Court has found such research helpful in 
certain significant cases. However, potential for abuse exists. 
The researcher recommends several precautions. First, opposing 
counsel should be given the opportunity to examine any family research 
considered by the Court, Second, judges and attorneys should be 
trained in the basic concepts of social science research. Finally, the 
development of manual and computer-assisted litigation support services 
will hopefully make quality family research availab l e to parties in 
litigation. 
Morgan has written about the first recommendation. He has written 
of judicial notice (a rule of evidence allowing the court to "notice" 
certain evidence, including research, upon the motion of parties and, 
in some cases, upon the court's own motion) and has noted that some 
courts have conducted independent research on their own in order to 
learn social facts. He criticized such practice {Morgan, 1944, at p. 
696) since, in his opinion, the courts usually obtained the information 
from other primary sources. He objected to the research by the Courts 
from libraries, experts, government agencies, and employees of an 
agency which is a party to the case . He wrote: 
The greatest objection to such practice is the 
disregard of the parties to the litigation, who 
are given no opportunity to be heard ••• 
{Morgan, 1944, at p. 696}. 
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Obviously, the quality of research can be more effectively evaluated if 
both parties have the right to comment and submit rebuttal arguments on 
any research or evidence judicially noticed by the Court on its own. 
The need for this procedure is emphasized by a recent case, 
Santosky v. Kramer, 50 U.S.L.W 4333. In this case the Supreme Court 
reversed a New York court decision involving neglected children. The 
Court ruled that New York's law (similar to that in 16 other states) 
was uncons t itut ion a l because it all owed parental rights to be termi-
nated based on a "fair preponderance" of the evidence. The Court ruled 
that "clear and convincing" proof is required {The National Law Journal, 
Monday, June 6, 1983, p. 13}. 
In reaching this decision the Court concluded that the "clear and 
convincing" evidence standard is needed because being freed for adop-
tion is not likely to advance the child's welfare. "Even when a child 
eventually finds an adoptive family, he may spend years moving between 
state institutions and 'temporary' foster placements after his ties to 
his natural parents have been severed" {National Law Journal, Monday, 
June 6, 1983, p. 13}. The Court cited a 1980 report to New York Mayor 
Edward I. Koch, "Redirecting Foster Care", with language "in 1979, on l y 
12 percent of the adoptable children in foster care in New York City 
were actually adopted, although some had been waiting for years •• 
(National Law Journal, supra). The National Law Journal concluded: 
The 12 percent figure cited by the court was simply 
wrong. The court seems to have been misled by the 
amicus brief's ambiguous description of the New York 
statistics. Apparently, the actual report was not 
read by the court • • • • At a time when the court's 
ruling shape so many areas of public policy, every-
thing possible must be done to assure that it per-
forms its role competently (National Law Journa l , 
Monday, June 6, 1983}. 
A classic example of the integration of legal and scientific 
knowledge was presented by the Supreme Court's language in Stanley v. 
Illinois, 31 Led 2d 551, 1967, (p . 560, footnote 7). The Court was 
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presented with the difficult task of balancing the rights of the state 
with those of the father of an illegitimate child (Stanley v. Illinois, 
31 Led 2d 551, p. 560, footnote 7). The Court referred to language of 
a Michigan Appeals decision (In reMark T., 8 Mich . App. 122, 154 N.W. 
2d 27' 1967}: 
We are not aware of any soci o 1 ogi ca 1 data justifying 
the assumption that an i l legitimate child rea red by 
his natura l father is less l ikely to receive a proper 
upbringing than one reared by his natural father, who 
was at the time married to his mother, or t hat t he 
stigma of illegitimacy is so pervasive it requires 
adoption by strangers and perma nent te rmination of a 
subsisting relationship with the chi l d ' s father. 
The U.S. Supreme Court, in refe rence to the above language, commented: 
It may be, as the State insists, that most unmarried 
fathers are unsuitab le and neg lectfu l parents • • . 
It may also be that Stanley is such a parent, that 
his children should be placed in other hands . But 
all unmarried fathers are not in this category, 
some are wholly suited to have custody (supra , at 
p. 560). 
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Second, the competence and training of judges and attorneys to 
evaluate empirical research must be examined as a factor leading to 
potential defects in the decis i on-making process . Attorneys and 
(consequently) judges have not traditionally been trained in the 
fundamentals of the empirical research method. And yet as outlined 
above, law has made use of expert witnesses from disciplines emphasizi ng 
the research method (economics, medicine, sociology, psychology, and 
other social sciences). 
Despite differences in language, many similarities exist between 
the law and science. Both the scientific and legal minds are concerned 
with causation. The student of social science, for example, studies 
the problems of generalizability and the concept of validity. The 
student of law studies admissibility in the rules of evidence and the 
1 ega 1 concept of re 1 eva ncy. The scientific mind teaches the dis t inc-
ti on between causation, correlation, and spurious relat i onships. The 
l egal mind is trained in causation through the concept of probable 
cause and distinctions are made between the admissibility of evidence 
r~evant to a particular legal issue and the weight to be attached to 
su:h evidence. Acts of God and other interveni ng variables beyond the 
co1trol of the actor are distinguished from the foreseeable consequences 
of the actor's conduct. 
The fac t that the legal profession has traditionally neglected 
tnining in the empirical method may well lead to incomplete or in-
co·rect analysis of evidence or expert opinion premised on empirica l 
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research. Attorneys and judges may completely reject behavioral 
experts {including family studies research) as being too speculative, 
uncertain, or immature as a science and as a result, refuse to consider 
any findings of substance or method from family researchers. On the 
other hand, a lack of training in research evaluation will surely not 
allow the attorney or judge to reject research with problems of sample 
size, or other defects of method or application of findings {i.e. Type 
I or Type II errors). 
Finally, the business of litigation support offers a great deal of 
hope, it appears, to the goal of facilitating the use of accurate, 
timely, and valid social science evidence in lower courts in family 
law, criminal, or tort cases. The entry of this evidence into the 
record at the lower court level, as well as its direct introduction in 
appellate briefs, should have the ultimate effect of greater utilization 
by the Supreme Court as it is called upon to interpret the law. 
Conclusion 
One of the authors of the document which created the Court {U.S . 
Constitution, Article Ill), may have resolved the issue of balance 
between "justice" and "truth" most appropriately . Chiseled in stone on 
a monument dedicated to his name, Thomas Jefferson is credited with 
these words: "I am not an advocate for frequent changes in laws and 
constitutions, but laws and institutions must go hand in hand ••• As 
new discoveries are made, new truths discovered, and manners and 
opinions change, with the change of circumstances institutions must 
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advance to keep pace with the times. We might as well requ i re a man to 
wear a stealthy coat which fit him as a boy as to require a society 
forever to remain under the regimen of our barbarous ancestors" 
(Jefferson Memorial, located on the Potomac River, Washington, D.C.). 
Family research is designed to discover "new truths" in the 
relations of parents, children, and spouses. This study demonstrates 
such research is used in constructing family policy. It is now time 
for family researchers to study the quality of the research used and 
the validity of any generalizations (from such research) made by 
counsel or court members. Ultimately it may be this family research 
introduced through the expert witness, the appellate brief, or judicial 
notice-- that may update judicial policy-makers and prevent our 
society from remaining under the "regimen" of notions of childhood or 
marriage from the different times and conditions of our "barbarous 
ancestors". 
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X. Discipline Used in Source 
(Behavioral Science) 
Psychology A. 
B. 
c. 
D. 
Sociology 
Psychiatry 
Anthropology 
E. 
E. 
F. 
G. 
H. 
I. 
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Economics and Financial Data 
General Source on Behav. Science 
Undetermined 
NATURE OF SOURCE 
s studies or empirical evidence considered by court 
de direct citation of by the court in text or footnote of decision 
LJ Law Journal Article cited 
T Law Text or Trea tise 
TF Task Force 
Comm Commission 
Found Foundation 
Cmt Comm i ttee 
AC Brief of Amicus Curiae 
PO Position or Project of Professional Organization 
EW Expert Witness at Trial Level 
E Writ Expert Writings 
Mon Monograph 
Bk General Book 
M Prof J Profess i onal Journal (Medical and Medical Related) 
E Prof J Professional Journal (Education) 
Ed Per Educational Periodicals or Journals 
Stat Statistics (Percentage or Quantitative Measurement Used) 
Gov Government Agency 
Psych Prof J Psychology Professiona l Journa l 
SSJ Social Service Journal 
Fed Ct. Three Judge Federal Court 
NP Newspaper 
Educ Education 
Pol Po liti cal 
BP Bar Periodical 
GP Govt. Periodical 
Web Webster's Dictionary 
Per. Periodical 
E Con Expert Consultant 
AR Academic Research 
Mag Magazine 
Bib Bible 
Diet. Dictionary 
NOTE: A page citation without reference to a footnote refers to a 
text citat ion 
SUBSTANTIVE 
LEGAL AREA 
I. Abortion 
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PARENT-CHILD RELATIONS 
CASE PAGE CITED SOURCE OF DECISION-MAKING 
US v Vuitch 
28 L Ed 2d 601 
1971 
p. 613 C ( 3), M Prof J (5), LJ 
Gov 
p. 614 fn 2 LJ, E 
fn 4 M Prof J 
Roe v Wade 
35 L Ed 2d 147 
Doe v Bolton 
35 L Ed 2d 201 
1972 
p. 156-7 E, F 
p. 164 E 
fn 8 Bk, E (5) I 
fn 9 LJ, Bk (5) E 
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p. 165 E 
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fn 15 Bk 
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fn 17 Bk 
fn 18 Bk (2) 
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fn 20 F 
fn 21 T (3) 
p. 166 E 
fn 10 Bk 
fn 21 Bk (3), LJ (2) 
fn 22 E, Bk (3) 
p. 167 fn 23 E 
fn 24 T 
fn 25 T 
fn 26 LJ, T 
p. 169 fn 33 Bk (4) 
fn 34 LJ 
SUBSTANTIVE 
LEGAL AREA 
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CASE PAGE CITED SOURCE OF DECISION-MAKING 
Roe v. Wade 
(cont.) 
p. 170 PO 
fn 37 LJ 
p. 171 
p. 172 
p. 173 
p. 174 
fn 43 
p. 175 fn 44 
fn 45 
p. 180 
p. 181 
fn 56 
fn 57 
fn 58 
fn 59 
fn 60 
fn 61 
fn 62 
p. 182 fn 62 
fn 63 
fn 64 
fn 65 
p. 190 
p. 192 fn 11 
Planned Parenthood 
of Cent. Missouri 
v. Danforth 
49 L Ed 2d 788 
1976 
p. 808 
p. 809 
p. 810 
p. 821 
p. 822 
Griswald v. 
State of Conn. 
14 L Ed 2d 510 
1965 
p. 537 fn 16 
p. 482 
PO 
F, PO (2) 
PO 
PO, E, F 
B (E), F 
F ( 4), AC 
LJ, Bk 
F (E) 
E, AC 
Bk 
Bk (3) 
AC, Bk 
Bk (2) 
Bk 
Bk (2) 
LJ (5), Bk 
LJ 
T (2), LJ 
T 
T, LJ 
F 
F 
Stat (f) (2) 
F 
F, B 
F, Stat, Ew (4) 
E 
F, B 
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I I I. Death 
IV. Domicil 
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5 L Ed 70 
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p. B4 
p. B5 
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Casl & Sur. Co. 
31 L Ed 2d 768 
1972 p. 779 
Stanley v. Illinois 
31 L Ed 2d 551 
1972 p. 560 
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28 L Ed 2d 288 
1971 p. 294 
p. 295 
p. 297 
p. 298 
p. 303 
p. 304 
Morayne v. State 
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28 L Ed 2d 339 
1970 p. 348 
p. 349 
Southern Co. 
v. Tomlinson 
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1896 p. 194 
Yarbough 
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78 L Ed 269 
1933 p. 281 
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fn 13 
fn 5 
fn 17 
fn 10 
fn 13 
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E 
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S, LJ 
T 
LJ 
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Comm, LJ 
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LJ 
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D.C. v. Murphy 
86 L Ed 329 
1941 p. 337 fn 10 LJ 
May v. Anderson 
97 L Ed 1221 
1953 p. 1230 fn 4 LJ 
Ennis v. Smith 
14 L Ed 472 
1852 p. 433 D 
Barber v. Barber 
16 L Ed 226 
1859 p. 230 T (2) 
Williams v. 
North Ca ro 1 ina 
87 L Ed 279 
1942 p. 294 LJ 
Prince v. 
Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts 
88 L Ed 645 
1944 p. 654 fn 15 Gov, Bk (2) 
fn 16 Gov (2), Bk 
Gems co, Inc. 
v. Wa 11 i ng 
89 L Ed 921 
1945 p. 927 fn 6 Stat 
p. 928 Stat 
p. 929 Stat 
fn 14 Stat 
fn 16 Stat (G) 
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Kent v. US 
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p. 94 fn 25 AC 
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18 L Ed 2d 527 Bk (Y) 
1967 fn 28 
p. 537 fn s LJ, Gov. 
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p. 539 fn 14 PO, Stat, Corrm, Bk, B, LJ, 
Gov 
fn 16 LJ 
fn 17 LJ 
p. 540 E 
fn 18 LJ (2) 
fn 19 LJ, Bk 
fn 20 Bk 
fn 21 LJ 
p. 541 fn 22 SSJ 
fn 23 LJ (2), Conm 
fn 24 LJ, Bk, Conm 
fn 25 LJ, C Mon. 
p. 542 fn 25 LJ 
fn 26 LJ, Conm, Found, Stat, Gov 
p. 543 Stat 
fn 44 Found, B 
fn 29 LJ 
fn 30 (Found) Bk, LJ (2), Bk, 
Comm 
p. 545 B 
fn 36 LJ 
fn 37 Comm, Found, Bk 
p. 546 fn 38 Bk 
fn 40 Comm 
p. 547 fn 44 Comm 
fn 46 LJ 
p. 548 fn 48 Comm 
p. 549 fn 53 LJ ( 2), PO 
fn 52 Comm 
p. 551 E Writ 
p. 552 Comm 
p. 552 fn 62 BP, LJ (4), PO 
fn 63 LJ ( 4) 
p. 552 fn 62 Bk 
fn 65 Comm 
p. 553 Gov, PO 
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In re Winship 
90 S Ct. 1068 
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Oyama v. State 
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Oyama v. State 
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fn 28 Gov, Stat 
fn 30 Bk 
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Breed v. Jones 
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1975 p. 356 Bk, LJ (2), Comm 
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p. 360 Comm 
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McKeiver v. 
Pennsylvania 
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fn 5 TF 
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Durst v. US 
55 L Ed 2d 14 
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fn 4 Gov 
fn 5 Gov 
fn 6 Gov 
fn 7 Gov 
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41 L Ed 2d 855 
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California 
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California 
37 L Ed 2d 419 
1972 p. 435 fn 12 EW 
p. 437 s 
fn 16 Bk (E), Pol 
p. 438 fn 16 Bk (4) Pol 
p. 440 fn 5 Gov 
p. 442 Gov 
Roth V. US 
1 L Ed 2d 1498 
1957 p. 1506 
p. 1507 fn 16 Gov 
p. 1508 fn 19 LJ 
p. 1509 fn 22 Bk 
p. 1519 fn 6 LJ 
p. 1521 LJ, A (3), B 
p. 1523 E, LJ 
Paris Adult 
Theater I v. 
Sl aton 
37 L Ed 2d 446 
1973 p. 423 fn 13 LJ 
p. 457 fn 8 Comm, A, E Writ 
p. 458 Bk 
fn 9 Bk (2) 
p. 470 fn 5 LJ 
fn 6 LJ, Bk 
p. 485 E, Stat, Comm 
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fn 23 Comm 
fn 24 Bk 
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Stanley v. 
Georgia 
22 L Ed 2d 542 
1969 p. 
p. 
Smith v. US 
52 L Ed 2d 324 
1977 p. 
p. 
p. 
Gingsberg v. 
State of NY 
20 L Ed 2d 195 
1968 p. 
p. 
p. 
p. 
Ginzberg v. US 
16 L Ed 2d 31 
1966 p. 
p. 
p. 
p. 
Mishkin v. 
State of NY 
16 L Ed 2d 56 
19E6 p. 
p. 
487 
fn 26 
497 fn 4 
550 fn 8 
fn 9 
551 
fn 10 
338 fn 12 
344 fn 11 
fn 12 
347 fn 22 
205 fn 10 
210 
211 fn 2 
fn 3 
213 (text) 
39 
46 fn 4 
48 fn 7 
fn 8 
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fn 7 
fn 8 
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Comm (gov) 
LJ 
A, B, LJ 
LJ 
Bk, LJ 
LJ (2) 
LJ 
LJ, A (2) 
Comm 
Bk 
Bk, c 
c 
LJ 
Bk, A, Psych Prof J 
Per (3), Mag (3) 
Bk (5) 
LJ 
I 
Bk (2) 
LJ 
Bk {C) 
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CASE PAGE CITED SOURCE OF DECISION-MAKING 
Time Film Corp. 
v. City of 
Chicago 
5 L Ed 2d 403 
1961 p. 417 fn 6 
p. 419 
Manual Enter-
prise Inc. v. 
Day 
8 L Ed 2d 639 
p. 420 
p. 422 
fn 11 
fn 12 
p. 423 fn 14 
p. 427 fn 3 
fn 4 
fn 5 
1962 p. 644 fn 4 
p. 654 fn 6 
p. 655 fn 7 
p. 659 fn 16 
Jacobellis v. 
Ohio 
12 L Ed 2d 793 
fn 17 
p. 664 fn 30 
E (Bk) 
Mag, NS 
LJ, Bk, AC 
Bk 
LJ 
LJ 
Bk 
Bk 
LJ 
Bk 
Diet. 
Bk (2), LJ (2), Gov (2) E 
Gov 
Gov 
Gov 
Gov 
1964 p. 802 fn 10 LJ 
Federal Com-
munication 
Comm . v. 
Pacifica 
Foundation 
57 L Ed 2d 1073 
1978 p. 1073 fn 5 Bib. 
p. 1111 AR 
Kingsley Books, 
Inc. v. Brown 
1 L Ed 2d 1469 
1957 p. 1474 LJ 
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CASE PAGE 
Young v. American 
Mini Theatres, Inc. 
p. 318 
us v. 12 200 
Foot Reels 
37 L Ed 2d 500 
1972 p. 507 
p. 509 
US v. Alpers 
94 L Ed 457 
1950 p. 460 
p. 462 
VIII. Poor and 
Poor Laws 
Goldberg v. 
Kelly 
25 L Ed 2d 287 
1970 p. 295 
p. 296 
p. 299 
p. 301 
Rosado v. Wyman 
26 L Ed 2d 442 
1970 p. 453 
New York Dept. 
of Social Services 
v. Dubl ino 
37 L Ed 2d 688 
1973 p. 695 
p. 697 
p. 698 
p. 699 
CITED SOURCE OF DECISION-MAKING 
fn 12 
fn 1 
fn 3 
f n 3 
fn 16 
fn 1 
fn 14 
fn 19 
fn 22 
fn 24 
fn 25 
fn 28 
EW 
LJ 
Bk (5) 
Bk (2), Comm 
LJ 
Po 1 Journ 
LJ 
LJ (2) 
LJ 
Stat, Gov 
Stat G 
AC 
Stat 
Gov 
Stat 
AC 
AC 
Gov, Stat 
Stat 
Gov 
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CASE PAGE CITED SOURCE OF DECISION-MAKING 
King v. Smith 
20 L Ed 2d 1118 
1968 p. 1118 Gov 
p. 1126 fn 14 Gov 
fn 15 Stat, G, Gov, LJ 
p. 1127 LJ, Bk (6) 
p. 1128 Stat, Gov 
p. 1132 Cmt . 
Shapiro v. 
Thompson 
22 L Ed 2d 600 
1969 p. 662 LJ 
p. 637 fn 30 LJ 
p. 705 Bk 
fn 31 Cmt., Gov 
Dandridge v. 
Williams 
25 L Ed 2d 491 
1970 p. 499 fn 10 Stat 
p. 500 Gov (2), Stat 
p. 502 fn 18 LJ 
p. 508 Gov 
p. 516 fn 2 Stat, G 
Wyman v. James 
27 L Ed 2d 408 
1971 p. 419 LJ, Stat (G) 
fn 1 LJ 
fn 2 Per. 
p. 422 LJ 
p. 423 s, A, B 
Stat, Gov 
fn 11 LJ 
fn 12 Bk 
p. 426 Appendix I I , Stat (g) 
Townsend v. Swan k 
30 L Ed 2d 448 
1971 p. 454 Gov 
SUBSTANTIVE 
LEGAL AREA 
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CASE PAGE CITED SOURCE OF DECISION-MAKING 
Jefferson 
v. Hackney p. 296 Stat 
406 us 535 fn 16 Stat 
1972 p. 297 Stat 
fn 17 Stat 
p. 299 Stat, Bk (2), LJ, Gov 
p. 300 fn 1 Gov, Stat (G) 
p. 301 fn 4 Stat (G) 
p. 302 Stat 
p. 311 Stat 
p. 312 Stat 
Super Tire 
Engineering Co . 
v. McCorkle 
40 L Ed 2d 1 
1974 p. 11 fn 1 LJ (4) 
Maher v. Roe (NOTE: Attached to Beal v. Doe decision) 
53 L Ed 2d 208 
1975 p. 216 fn 7 LJ (2) 
Knebel v. Hein 
50 L Ed 2d 485 
1977 p. 492 fn 15 Gov 
fn 17 Stat (C) 
Batterson 
v. Francis 
42 L Ed 2d 448 
1977 p. 462 Stat 
Beal v. Doe 
53 L Ed 2d 464 
1977 p. 477 Stat, F, Gov 
p. 478 fn 1 Stat, G 
p. 479 fn 1 Cmt, Stat, 8, F, Gov 
p. 481 fn 3 Stat 
fn 4 Gov, Stat F 
Queen v. Mandley 
56 L Ed 2d 658 
1978 p. 669 Stat 
p. 670 Gov, s 
fn 13 LJ 
fn 14 LJ 
fn 15 LJ 
SUBSTANTIVE 
LEGAL AREA 
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CASE PAGE CITED SOURCE OF DECISION-MAKING 
Poelker v. Doe 
53 L Ed 2d 528 
1977 p. 478 
p. 532 
Wolman v. 
97 S. Ct. 
1977 
Walter 
2593 
p. 2598 
p. 2615 fn 3 
Ingraham v. Wright 
51 L Ed 2d 711 
1977 p. 720 
p. 
p. 
Levitt v. 
Committee for 
Public Education 
37 L Ed 2d 736 
721 
723 
fn 5 
fn 9 
fn 13 
fn 14 
fn 15 
fn 16 
(NOTE: this citation 
in Beal v. Doe applies 
to this opinion. 
Stat 
M Prof J, F 
Stat 
LJ 
Stat 
Stat 
F 
E, Bk (2) 
E, Bk 
(3) Bk 
Educ (2), Bk 
1973 p. 740 fn 2 H 
p. 743 I 
Committee for 
Public Education 
v. Nyquist 
37 L Ed 2d 
1973 p. 959 
p. 960 
p. 961 
p. 962 
p. 977 
p. 990 
Emerson v. 
Board of Education 
91 L Ed 711 
1946 p. 720 
p. 721 
fn 21 
fn 23 
fn 28 
fn 28 
fn 55 
fn 1 
fn 5 
fn 7 
fn 11 
fn 12 
Cmt 
Stat, Gov 
E 
Cmt., E (3) 
Stat 
Stat, G 
E 
(E) Bk, G 
E 
Bk (2) 
E, Bk 
Per, E 
SUBSTANTIVE 
LEGAL AREA 
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CASE PAGE CITED SOURCE OF DECISION-MAKING 
Everson v. 
Board of Education 
(continued) p. 722 E 
fn 13 (E) (Bk) {4) 
fn 14 Bk (E) {2) 
fn 16 Bk {2) 
fn 17 E 
fn 18 LJ 
p. 723 fn 20 Bk 
p. 733 E 
fn 11 Bk {6) E 
p. 734 E 
fn 16 E, Bk 
fn 17 E, Bk 
fn 18 E, Bk 
fn 19 E, Bk 
fn 20 E, Bk 
fn 21 E, Bk 
p. 735 E 
fn 22 Bk E 
fn 23 Bk E 
fn 24 Bk E 
fn 25 Bk E 
fn 26 Bk E 
fn 27 Bk E 
p. 736 E 
fn 28 E Bk 
fn 29 E Bk 
fn 30 E Bk -
fn 31 E Bk 
p. 737 E 
fn 33 E 
fn 34 E 
p. 744 fn 51 Stat G 
p. 746 fn 55 E Bk (2) 
p. 747 fn 60 
McCollum v. Board 
of Education 
333 us 203 
1948 p. 660 fn H 
SUBSTANTIVE 
LEGAL AREA 
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CASE PAGE CITED SOURCE OF DECISION-MAKING 
Adriches v. Kress 
398 us 144 
1970 p. 168 f n 2 E 
Tilton V. 
Richardson 
29 L Ed 2d 790 
1971 
US v. Moreland 
258 us 433 
1922 
Green v. Co. 
School Board 
20 L Ed 716 
p. 
p. 
p. 
p. 
p. 
p. 
p. 
803 
fn 3 
808 
fn 3 
808 
704 fn 1 
705 fn 2 
fn 4 
706 
fn 8 
fn 9 
fn 10 
fn 12 
fn 13 
707 fn 14 
fn 15 
fn 16 
fn 18 
1968 p. 725 
Board of Ed . 
v. Allen 
20 L Ed 2d 1060 
1968 p. 1066 
p. 1068 fn 9 
p. 1073 
p. 1078 fn 17 
B (2) 
(G) LJ (2) 
Bk 
Bk 
Bk, Stat 
Stat 
Stat, Bk 
E 
Bk (E) 
Bk E 
Bk E 
Bk E 
Bk 
E, LJ, Bk 
E Bk (2) 
Bk 
E Bk 
E, LJ, Bk 
Stat, Gov. 
Gov. 
Stat, Gov. 
Bk (Educ.) 
E, Bk 
Bk 
(2) 
(2) 
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LEGAL AREA 
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CASE PAGE CITED SOURCE OF DECISION-MAKING 
Lemon v. Kurtzman 
29 L Ed 2d 745 
Early v. Di Censo 
29 L Ed 2d 745 
1971 p. 757 fn 6 B, s, Educ, LJ 
p. 761 LJ 
p. 764 E Stat 
fn 1 Bk 
fn 2 Bk 
fn 3 Per. 
fn 4 Per. 
p. 765 fn 6 Bk 
fn 7 Bk 
fn 8 Bk 
fn 9 Bk 
fn 10 Bk (E) 
fn 11 Bk (E) 
fn 12 Bk (Educ.) (2) 
fn 13 Stat, Gov. 
fn 14 (Educ) (Per.) 
p. 766 fn 15 Bk (#) Educ. 
p. 767 E 
p. 768 B, s 
p. 768 fn 20 D, Bk 
p. 773 fn 1 Stat 
p. 774 fn 2 Bk, (Educ.) 
p. 774 fn 3 Bk 
fn 4 Bk (3} 
p. 775 fn 5 Bk E (Educ) 
p. 777 fn 9 Gov 
Norwood v. 
Harrison 
37 L Ed 2d 723 
1973 p. 727 Stat 
p. 728 Stat, G 
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SUBSTANTIVE CASE PAGE CITED SOURCE OF DECISION-MAKING 
LEGAL AREA 
San Antonia v. 
Rodriguez 
36 L Ed 2d 16 
1973 p. 28 G 
stat (Gov) 
fn 15 Cmt., stat 
fn 16 Bk educ. 
fn 17 Bk, stat (G) 
p. 29 fn 20 E, Cmt, G 
fn 21 G stat 
fn 22 Cmt 
fn 23 stat 
fn 24 G, stat 
fn 25 Cmt 
p. 30 fn 27 G 
fn 29 LJ (Educ) 
fn 30 stat G 
fn 31 G 
p. 31 stat, G 
fn 33 stat 
fn 35 G, H ( 4) 
p. 35 fn 49 stat, G 
p. 37 fn 53 stat, G (LJ) 
fn 54 stat, G (LJ) 
fn 55 stat, G (LJ) 
p. 38 fn 38 G 
fn 39 G 
p. 40 LJ (3) 
p. 45 LJ (2) 
p. 48 LJ (4) 
fn 85 Bk 
p. 49 Cmt., s 
p. 50 fn 89 stat (G) 
p. 51 fn 101 stat 
fn 105 Bk 
Comm 
p. 52 E 
fn 104 Bk (2) 
p. 53 fn 107 stat , G 
p. 54 E Writ, Po 1 , , Educ (2 ) , 
Bk (2) 
p. 57 fn 111 G, AC 
fn 113 Educ., Bk, stat 
fn 114 Gov (3) 
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SUBSTANTIVE CASE PAGE CITED SOURCE OF DECISION-MAKING 
LEGAL AREA 
San Antonia v. 
Rodriguez (cant). 
p. 60 G stat 
p. 61 ~tat (2), G 
fn 62 stat G 
p. 62 G stat (7) 
p. 66 stat 
fn 6 stat 
p. 67 Educ, stat G (3) 
p. 68 tn 14 stat 
fn 16 stat 
p. 69 G 
fn 27 G 
fn 28 G 
p. 70 G 
fn 31 G 
fn 32 G 
fn 33 G 
fn 34 G 
p. 72 EW 
fn 40 G, stat, Educ (4) 
p. 73 stat, educ (5) 
fn 44 stat 
fn 47 stat 
p. 76 E Writ (3), G 
p. 79 LJ 
fn 56 LJ (2), stat (2) 
p. 88 fn 67 LJ 
fn 68 AC (Educ) 
p. 89 fn 71 Comm 
p. 90 Pol., Educ, stat 
fn 72 A, B, s 
fn 73 stat, Gov . (2) , GP (2) 
p. 94 fn 79 Bk (2 ) 
p. 98 G 
fn 94 EW 
p. 103 G, EW 
p. 104 G, EW 
p. 105 G, EW 
Epperson v. 
State of Arkansas 
21 L Ed 2d 228 
1968 p. 233 fn 9 Bk 
fn 10 Bk 
SUBSTANTIVE 
LEGAL AREA 
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CASE PAGE CITED SOURCE OF DECISION-MAKING 
Epperson v. State 
of Arkansas (cont.) 
p. 234 fn 8 LJ 
fn 13 LJ 
p. 236 fn 15 Bk (3), E, LJ (3) 
Brown v. Board 
of Education of 
Topeka 
98 L Ed 983 
1953 p. 878 E 
fn 4 E (Educ) Bk (3) 
p. 881 A 
fn 11 A, s, Psych Prof J (2) 
Bk, A (4) (Educ) 
Wisconsin 
v. Yoder 
32 L Ed 2d 15 
1972 p. 23 D 
p. 25 D 
p. 26 D 
fn 7 E (2) 
fn 8 D 
p. 27 fn 9 (E) Bk 
p. 29 D, A, B, EW 
fn12 0, A, B, E Writ 
p. 31 E (Bk) (2) 
fn 13 EW D Bk 
fn 14 E, Bk (2) 
fn 15 Gov 
p. 42 Bk (D), stat, LJ 
fn 3 A (Bk) (5) 
B (Bk) 
fn 4 B LJ 
EW, D, Bk 
p. 43 D 
SUBSTANTIVE 
LEGAL AREA 
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CASE PAGE CITED SOURCE OF DECISION-MAKING 
West Virginia State 
Board of Education 
v. Barnette 
87 L Ed 1628 
1943 p. 1632 fn 3 (E) Bk 
p. 1634 fn 11 (survey) B, ns, stat 
fn 12 Per. (educ.) 
p. 1635 fn 13 E (13) 
p. 1636 fn 15 Pol., Bk (3), LJ (4) 
1637 fn 17 p. 
p. 1641 
Zorach v. Clausen 
96 L Ed 954 
1952 p. 960 
fn 5 
p. 964 
fn 1 
fn 2 
fn 3 
Committee for 
Public Education 
v. Nyquist 
37 L Ed 2d 948 
1973 p. 960 
fn 23 
p. 961 fn 28 
p. 971 
p. 973 
p. 977 fn 55 
p. 978 fn 2 
p. 984 
fn 4 
fn 5 
p. 985 
Tinker v. Des Moines 
Indep. Community School 
District 
21 L Ed 2d 731 
Gov 
Bk (E) 
Per. (Educ) 
(Bk) Educ (5), 
LJ 
Bk (4) 
Bk {3) 
Bk {2) 
stat, gov. 
stat, gov. 
Comm, E 
G 
G 
stat, B 
Gov., stat 
stat 
stat 
stat 
stat 
1969 p. 737 LJ 
p. 749 
fn 4 stat 
Per. Educ (6) 
SUBSTANTIVE 
LEGAL AREA 
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CASE PAGE CITED SOURCE OF DECISION-MAKING 
Wheeler v. Barrera 
41 L Ed 2d 159 
1974 p. 168 Gov. 
p. 169 fn 7 stat 
p. 170 fn 8 stat G (survey) 
p. 176 
Meek v. Pittenger 
44 L Ed 2d 217 
1975 p. 231 
p. 232 
p. 241 
p. 246 
Goss v. Lopez 
42 L Ed 2d 415 
1976 p. 743 
p. 745 
p. 749 
Milliken v. Bradley 
42 L Ed 2d 745 
fn 20 
stat 
fn 14 stat 
fn 15 stat (G) 
G 
fn 3 stat, (Educ) 
Gov 
fn 9 Bk (B)s, stat 
fn 10 AC, stat, Gov . 
fn 11 Bk (H) 
stat 
fn 20 Educ, stat 
fn 21 Educ, stat 
H, B, Ew, AC, 
1977 p. 750 fn 3 stat 
p. 751 fn 9 EW 
p. 754 fn 11 stat 
Dayton Board of 
Education v. Brinkman 
53 L Ed 2d 851 
1977 p. 856 
p. 857 
p. 858 
Bradley v. School Bd. 
of City of Richmond 
40 L Ed 2d 476 
1974 p. 483 
p. 484 
p. 492 
fn 
fn 
fn 
fn 
fn 
5 
10 
4 
5 
26 
stat 
E 
stat 
stat 
stat 
stat 
Gov (2) 
stat, Gov. 
SUBSTANTIVE 
LEGAL AREA 
76 
PARENT-CHILD RELATIONS 
CASE PAGE 
Pasadena City Board 
of Education v. 
Sprangler 
49 L Ed 2d 599 
1976 p. 606 
p. 608 
Keyes v. School 
District No. 1 
37 L Ed 2d 548 
1973 p. 533 
p. 556 
p. 557 
p. 558 
p. 559 
p. 561 
p. 562 
p. 569 
p. 571 
p. 575 
p. 581 
p. 582 
p. 583 
p. 586 
CITED SOURCE OF DECISION-MAKING 
fn 2 
fn 6 
fn 7 
fn 8 
fn 10 
fn 12 
fn 13 
fn 15 
fn 3 
fn 4 
fn 5 
fn 9 
fn 14 
fn 19 
fn 20 
fn 21 
fn 29 
Stat 
Stat 
Stat 
Stat 
Stat 
Stat, Gov (Educ) 
Comm (2) 
Comm 
Stat 
Stat 
EW 
Stat 
Stat 
Stat 
(Gov) Stat 
(Gov) Stat 
Gov 
Per., E Writ, stat 
LJ 
LJ 
LJ 
E, B 
E Writ 
Stat, E, Gov 
G 
EW, Bk, LJ, s, Gov 
SUBSTANTIVE 
LEGAL AREA 
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CASE PAGE CITED SOURCE OF DECISION-MAKING 
Lemon v. 
Kurtzman 
29 L Ed 2d 745 
p. 753 
p. 757 fn 6 
p. 768 
p. 774 
p. 775 fn 2 
fn 3 
fn 4 
fn 5 
Bustop, Inc . v. 
Board of Education 
City of Los Angeles 
99 S. Ct. 40 
58 L Ed 2d 88 
1978 p. 89 
Hills v. Gautreaux 
47 L Ed 2d 792 
1976 p. 798 
fn 4 
fn 5 
p. 807 fn 19 
Cleveland Board 
of Education 
v. La Fleur 
39 L Ed 2d 52 
Cohen v. Chesterfield 
County School Board 
39 L Ed 2d 52 
1974 p. 60 fn 8 
Stat (Fed Ct.) 
B 
E 
Bk 
Bk 
Bk (E) 
E Bk (3) 
Stat 
Stat 
Stat 
Stat 
Stat (G) 
Gov, LJ (2 ) 
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SUBSTANTIVE 
LEGAL AREA 
CASE PAGE CITED SOURCE OF DECISION-MAKING 
Cleveland Board 
of Education v. 
La Fleur 
39 L Ed 2d 52 
Cohen v. Chersterfield 
County School Board 
39 L Ed 2d 52 
1974 p. 60 
fn 9 EW 
fn 12 F, EW, LJ, (F ) 
M Prof J, Bk 
fn 15 LJ 
Wood v. Strickland 
43 L Ed 2d 214 
1975 p. 223 fn 9 
fn 10 
p. 224 fn 11 
p. 227 fn 24 
Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board 
of Education 
28 L Ed 2d 554 
1971 p. 561 
p. 562 
p. 563 
p. 565 fn 5 
fn 6 
p. 566 fn 5 
p. 574 fn 11 
Socia 1 Security and 
Unemployment Compensation 
Van Lare v. Hurley 
44 L Ed 2d 208 
1975 p. 216 fn 7 
Geduldig v. Aiello 
41 L Ed 2d 256 
1974 p. 267 fn 4 
f n 5 
fn 6 
T, Bk 
Bk 
Gov ( Educ) 
EW 
stat 
stat,. E Con 
E Con 
stat 
stat (Gov) 
(Cmt) (Gov) stat 
stat 
LJ (2) 
PO., F 
stat, Gov 
Comm, Gov 
SUBSTANTIVE 
LEGAL AREA 
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CASE PAGE CITED SOURCE OF DECISION-MAKING 
Geduldig v. Aiello (continued) 
p. 268 fn 7 Gov 
p. 269 fn 8 AC 
Weinberger v. Salfi 
45 L Ed 2d 522 
1975 p. 546 (text) Gov 
p. 547 (text) Gov 
p. 548 fn 13 stat, Gov, G 
p. 554 fn 7 Gov 
fn 8 Gov 
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SUBSTANTIVE 
LEGAL AREA 
CASE PAGE CITED SOURCE OF DECISION-MAKING 
I. Adultery and 
Fornication 
Eisenstaddt 
v. Baird 
31 L Ed 2d 349 
1972 p. 368 (fn) F, Gov. 
II. Bigamy 
I I I. 
Reynolds v. US 
25 L Ed 244 
1879 p. 250 E, D 
Divorce and 
Separation 
Granville-Smith 
v. Granvi 11 e 
99 L Ed 773 
1955 p. 
p. 
p. 
p. 
Maynard v. Hi 11 
31 L Ed 654 
1888 
Sutton v. Lei b 
96 L Ed 448 
1952 
Griffin v. 
Griffin 
90 L Ed 635 
p. 
p. 
p. 
780 (fn 18) (estimate) G Stat. 
781 (fn 18} Stat, Gov. 
(fn 19) Stat, Gov. (3) 
(fn 20) Stat, Gov. 
Gov. Stat (5 ) 
782 Stat 
(fn 22) Gov., Bk 
786 LJ 
657 (T) 
456 ( fn 17) LJ 
457 (fn 18) LJ 
1945 p. 644 (fn 6) LJ 
SUBSTANTIVE 
LEGAL AREA 
IV. Husband 
and Wi fe 
81 
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CASE PAGE 
People of State 
of NY ex rel. 
Halvey v. Halvey 
91 L Ed 1133 
1974 p. 1139 
Loughran v. 
Loughran 
78 L Ed 1219 
1934 p. 1223 
Esenwein v. 
Com of Pa 
ex rel Esenwein 
89 L Ed 1608 
1945 p. 1608 
Sosna v. Iowa 
42 L Ed 2d 532 
1975 p. 543 
Boddie v. 
Connecticut 
38 L Ed 2d 113 
1971 p. 123 
Vanderbilt v. 
Vanderbi 1t 
1 L Ed 2d 1456 
1957 p. 1468 
Kovacs v. Brewer 
2 L Ed 2d 1008 
1958 p. 1014 
p. 1015 
Hi squ i erdo v. 
Hisquierdo 
59 L Ed 2d 1 
1979 p. 10 
p. 13 
CITED SOURCE OF DECISION~~AKING 
fn 8 
fn 3 
fn 1 
fn 3 
fn 14 
fn 4 
fn 14 
fn 18 
LJ 
LJ 
LJ 
LJ 
LJ 
LJ 
LJ 
LJ 
LJ 
LJ (2) 
I 
SUBSTANTIVE 
LEGAL AREA 
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CASE PAGE CITED SOURCE OF DECISION41AKI NG 
Fronti era 
et vir. v. 
Richardson 
36 L Ed 2d 583 
1973 p. 589 Stat, Bk, TF, COITITl 
fn 13 E, Bk (2) 
p. 59D fn 13 BK (E) 
p. 591 BK, E 
fn 15 TF, Bk (2) CoiTITl 
fn 16 LJ 
fn 17 AC, Stat 
fn 18 LJ 
fn 19 LJ (2) 
fn 20 LJ 
fn 21 Gov 
p. 593 fn 23 Gov (3), CoiTITl, Stat, G 
United States 
v. Dege 
4 L Ed 2d 1563 
1960 p. 1565 LJ 
Appendi x B 
1953. 
Sample Text and Footnotes 
DROWN v. DOAROlJF 1-:DUC.ITIClN OF Tnn:KA 
tht•m of some of Lhc l.Jcnclils they 
would receive in a racial[ly] inte-
grated school system."" 
Whatever may have been the ex-
tent of psychological knowledf,'e at 
the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this 
finding is amply supported by 
modern authority.11 Any language 
•[49S] 
•in Plessy v. Fergus<;>n contrary to 
thl'l.-finding is rejectec. 
We conclude that .. in the field of 
public education the doctrine of 
"separate but equal" has 
Headnote ' no place. Separate edu-
cational facilities are in-
herently unequal. Therefore, we 
hold that the plaintiffs and others 
similarly situated for whom the ac-
tion~ have l.Jeen l.Jrought arc, by 
reason of the segregation com-
plained of, deprived of the equal 
protection of the laws guaranteed by 
the Fourteenth Amendment. This 
disposition makes unnecessary any 
discussion whether such segregation 
10. A :similar finding was made in the 
Delaware case: "I conclude from the tes-
timony that in our Del:lwnre society, State-
imposed segregation in education itself re-
sults in the Ne~ro chilJrcn, as a cla~s, 
receiving educational opportunitie:s which 
nre substnnti;J.IIy inferior to those avail-
able to white children otherwise simi larly 
situated." - Del Ch -, 87 A::!d 8G2, 3G5. 
11. K. B. Clark, Effect of Prejudice nnd 
Discrimination on Personality Dcvdop· 
mcnt ( Midc:cntury White House Confer· 
ence on Children and Youth, 1!>50); Wit. 
mer and Kotin5ky, Pcr~onnlity in the 
l\lnkin~ (1~!".:!), ch VI; n\·Ullldwr UIHI 
Chcin, The l':;ychological Effects of En· 
forced Scgre~ation: A Survey o! Social 
Science Opinion, 26 J Psycho! 259 (HH8); 
• Chcin, What are the P.sycholo~ical F:!T.:-ct~ 
of Se:::-rc~ntion Under Conditions o! Equal 
Faciiitics?, 3 Tnt J Opinion and Attitude 
]{to~ :..!:!!) ( 1 9-W); UramclJ, Education:... I 
Costs, in lliscriminntion nnd Nntionnl 
W('lfue ( ~b.cl\' c r, ed, 1!).1!)), 4 ·1-U~; 
Frazier, The Nc~ro in the United States 
{19·t9), G7 ·1-G8l. And sec generally 
Myrdal , An American Dilemma ( 1044). 
12.. s~e llo\linl{ v. Sh:~.rpe, 3-17 US 497, 
98 L etl 884, 7·1 S Ct G93, post, p 88·1, con· 
rl·rnitllo!" thc Due l'roces::~ Clnuse o! the 
Fifth Amendment. 
13. " ·1. A!:i5uming it i~ decided that scg. 
6G 
also violate~ the Due Process Clnuse 
of the Fourteenth Amendment." 
Because thC:-)C nrc class actions, 
because of the wide applicability of 
this decision, and because of the 
great variety of local conditions, the 
formulation of decrees in these cas~s 
presents problems of considerable 
complexity. On reargument, the 
consider:ttion of appropriate relief 
wns necessarily subordinated to the 
primary question-the constitution-
ality of segreJ:ation in public educa-
tion. We have now announced that 
such segregation is a denial of the 
equal protection of the laws. In 
order that we may have the full 
assistance of the parties in formu-
latin!! <l<•rr~c", the ca>~e" will be re-
~t~rcd to lhe docket, and the parties 
are re~uested to present further 
argument on Questions 4 and 5 
previously propounded by the Court 
for the reargument this Term." The 
'11~6] 
Attorney General •of the United 
re gati on in public schools violates the 
F ourteenth Amendment 
u (a) woultl a decree necess:lrily fo llow 
providing thnt, within the limit~ set hy 
normal j.!"eogr~phic school di s trict i r.~, 
Negro children should forthwi th be ad· 
mit ted to schools of their choice, or 
"(b) may this Court, in the exercise of 
its equity ]Jowers, pe rmit nn dfect ive .'IT:ld· 
unl adju :;tm;•nt to he brought about from 
cxistinl: ~eJ.!r<'~atcd systcm3 to a ~ystem 
not bn.s('d on color distinctions! 
"G. On the n.->surnption on whi~:h qucs• 
tions 4 (a) nnd (I•) nrc hn..o;cd, nnrl 
:mmint: furlhrr thal. thi~ Court will t·x-
ercise its equity powers to the end de· 
5cribed in f!Ucstion 4 (b), 
"(a) !:ihould this Court formulate de. 
tailed denc(':<\ in thC'~c ra!';t's; 
"(b) if M, wh!lt s pecific issue:s should 
the dl'CT<'es rench; 
"(c) s hould this Cr1 urt nppoint a special 
master to henr evidence with n view to 
recomtn('nding speciflc terms for :such de· 
crees; 
"(d) "-shoulll this Court remand to the 
courts o! first instance with directions to I 
fr:~.rnc J(•crccs in th<'se C:l.."i"', Bnd if so 1 
what f:Cn(•ral direction~ ~houlrl lhc decree!\ 
of thi:. Court include :md what pro~o:t•d.ures 
should the courts of first im;tance follow 
in urriving n.t the specific terms of more 
detniled decrees?" • 
98 L <U SSI 
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Appendi x C 
Sample Case Abstracts 
Schools § 1
1 
~~ation questions, see CIVIL RIGHTS § 6. such responsibilities, like all other state activ· 
Education is an object of national concern ~?~1 :~~tti~~ti~~:;c;::ui~~:~\:"~Yt~:::t; I .~.ooo:d a proper subject of legislation. Dartmouth to state action. Cooper v Aaron, 358 US 1, 20, 
College,. Woodward, 4 Wheat 518, 78 S Ct 1401, · 
4 LEd 629 3 LEd 2d 5,19 
E\'e!"\· person, although having no children 
is liahie for and receives benefit from the The vigilant protection of constitutional 
su?port of the schools. Kelly v Pittsburgh, 104 freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the , 
cs 78. ~u~:~~~~4 ~r5 ~~~~~a~ C~~~.ls. Shelton v j 
26 L Ed 658 5 L Ed 2d 231 
Jut!sment creditors of a city school board, 
... ~~ daims a re payable out of the school 
~~ are entitled to require the city to ac-
~unt for the amount of such taxes collected 
3 r.d held in trust by the city for the payment 
of the expenses of the public schools, where 
::.e school board declines to compel such an 
xcounting. New Orleans v Fisher, 180 US 
IE..S, 21 5 Ct 347, 
45 LEd 465 
,.\ statute of a territory enacted to bring 
~o~ign language schools under a strict gov-
~mment control, for which no adequate rea-
.ioOn ~ ~hewn, the enforcement of which will 
probably destroy most, if not all, such schools, 
::.r:cor..::•itutionally deprives parents of the 
~;;ht to direct the education of their children. 
f..trr:n~on \" Tokushige, 273 US 284, 47 S Ct 
~.)6. 
71 LEd 646 
A J3panese parent in Hawaii has the con-
ttnutior.al r ight to direct the education of his 
o-n child wi thout unreasonable restriction!'!. 
F'.ur.ngton v Tokushige, 273 US 284, 47 S Ct 
406. 
71 LEd 646 
A. st.at.e may regulate the method of provid-
; :'1( for the education of its youth at public 
'"'~n.$1:?. Gong Lum v Rice, 275 US 78, 48 S 
C: 91. 
72LEd172 
Lto.gi.slation intended to facilitate the oppor-
!·..: nity of children to get a secular education 
-r"\·~ a public purpose. E\·erson v Board of 
?:.:" . 3.30 US I, 67 S Ct 504, 168 ALR 1392, 
91 LEd 711 
0?pJrtunity of education, where the state 
:-_,_,; .t::"l<!ertaken to provide it, must be made 
.l\""3i o.J.b!e to all on equal terms. Brown v 
?..·Md of I::ducation, 347 US 483 74 S Ct 686 
:;..<\ .-\LR:!.d 1180, , ' 
98 LEd 873 
~r~ation in public education is not rea-
.. -: :-d·.;y ~t l atl'd to .my government:::~ I objec· 
~-;. S.,!!Jng: v Sharpe, 347 US 497, 74 S Ct 
98 LEd 864 
'.:.o\\~_il>? t~t! responsibility for public educa-
. n l.'i pnmarily the concern of the sutes, 
Keyishian v University of New York 
Board of Regents, 385 US 589, 87 S Ct 
675, 
17 LEd 2d 629 
Tinker v Des Moines Independent Com-
munity School Dist. 393 US 503, 89 S 
Ct 733, 
21 LEd 2d 731 
A state has a legitimate interest in protect-
ing its educational system from subversion. 
Keyishian v University of )/ew York Board of 
Regents, 385 US 589, 87 S Ct 675, 
17 LEd 2d 629 
Courts cannot intervene in the resolution of 
conflicts which arise in the daily operation of 
school systems and which do not directly and 
sharply implicate basic constitutional values. 
Epperson v Arkansas, 393 US 97, 89 S Ct 266, 
21 LEd 2d 228 
A state may not impose and enforce any 
conditions that it chooses upon attendance at 
public institutions of learning, however viola-
tive they may be of fundamental constitu-
tional guaranties. Tinker v Des Moines Inde-
pendent Community School Dist. 393 US 503, 
89 S Ct 733, 
21 LEd 2d 731 
It is within the broad discretionary powers 
of school authorities to conclude, as an educa· 
tiona! policy, that in order to prepare stu-
dents to live in a pluralistic society, each 
school should have a prescribed ratio of Negro 
to white students reflecting the proportion for 
the school district as a whole; absent a finding 
of a constitutional violation, however, this is 
not within the authority of a federal court. 
Swann v Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Ed-
ucation, 402 US 1, 91 S Ct 1267, 
28 LEd 2d 554 
School authorities have wide discretion in 
formulating school policy, and may conclude, 
as a matter of educational policy apart from 
any constitutional requirements. that some 
kind of racin.l balance in the schools is d~sira­
ble. North Carolina State Board of Education 
v Swann, 402 US 43, 91 S Ct 1284, 
28 LEd 2d 586 
In the context of the special characteri3tics 
of a school environment, the power of the 
401 
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